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Abstract
We conducted a simple, anonymous survey at the beginning of 2014, asking
around 200 economists worldwide to reveal their expectations about US infla-
tion. The outcome of the survey shows that a significant share of respondents
revealed asymmetric inflation expectations and that the deviation from sym-
metry is sizeable. The aggregate distribution we obtain is moderately skewed
to the right. Interestingly though, it is disagreement among respondents and
not the asymmetry of their subjective distributions that drives the aggregate
skewness. In fact, ignoring individual asymmetry changes little in terms of
mean and variance of the aggregate distribution.
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1 Introduction
Inflation expectations constitute a vital part of decision–making by companies,
households and policymakers alike. The most common way to collect data on in-
flation expectations is by means of surveys, where respondents are asked to pro-
vide their inflation expectations by specifying a point forecast,1 an interval2 or an
entire distribution of possible outcomes.3 Numerous users of these surveys focus
mostly on the first two moments of the distribution. Still, if the asymmetry of
forecasters’ subjective distributions is high and not taken into account, the point
forecasts provide a poor description of forecasters’ expectations. More generally,
asymmetry contains information on how likely forecasters deem ‘extreme’ infla-
tion rates and might explain the so called inflation scare observed in the bond
market particularly in 1983–1984, see García & Manzanares (2007).
Characterizing asymmetry in the survey data is challenging. Consider for in-
stance the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Given that the forecasters
provide probabilities of inflation falling into specified ‘bins’, one needs to assume
a parametric form of subjective distribution to obtain its moments. The literature
has debated several candidate distributions starting with the normal (Giordani
& Söderlind, 2003), which imposes symmetry, the skew-normal (García & Man-
zanares, 2007) and the generalized beta (see e.g. Engelberg, Manski & Williams,
2009; Clements, 2014). Additional difficulty is estimating parameters of the cho-
sen distribution on a relatively small number of observed bins. These might be
the reasons for which the literature offers little guidance on how high is the asym-
metry of subjective distributions in surveys of inflation and how important is to
account for those asymmetries when aggregating inflation expectations.
This paper tries to fill the gap by conducting and reporting a survey that di-
rectly tests whether subjective distributions of future US headline inflation are
asymmetric and by exploring how these asymmetries affect the aggregate distri-
bution. We conducted the survey during the transition of Fed leadership from Ben
1Consensus Economics survey and Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey are two important
examples.
2For example, the Regional Network Company Survey conducted by the Swiss National Bank
(SNB). Survey results are regularly published in the monetary policy report (in German), visit the
following page.
3Most notably, the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia.
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Bernanke to Janet Yellen in the beginning of 2014. We asked the respondents to
provide two intervals of expected inflation over the next two years: conditional on
Janet Yellen being the Fed chair, and in a counterfactual scenario in which Ben
Bernanke would have remained the chairman of the Fed. The political framing of
the questions was intended to prevent participants from answering the survey as
if it were a purely technical inquiry. In a second step, we simply asked them to give
a probability of inflation being higher or lower than the midrange of a (randomly
selected) interval that they have provided.
We document significant departures from symmetry of the subjective probability
distributions. More specifically, about 60% of our respondents revealed asymmet-
ric distributions with mean absolute deviation being equal to a probability mass
of 0.19. We then impose parametric assumptions on subjective distributions to
obtain an aggregate distribution. In terms of expected inflation, the results from
our survey are comparable to the corresponding outcome of the SPF for the first
quarter of 2014. By exploiting the design of our survey, we show that ignoring
asymmetry of subjective distributions has little effect on the moments of the ag-
gregate distribution. The aggregate distribution is moderately positively skewed,
but we find that the aggregate skewness is driven by disagreement among respon-
dents and not the asymmetry of their subjective distributions.
Our paper relates to the literature on the analysis of expectation surveys, such as
the SPF. García & Manzanares (2007) find that the aggregate expectation distri-
bution is mostly positively skewed and that accounting for asymmetry by imposing
skew-normal densities leads to a better fit of subjective distributions. Lahiri, Tei-
gland & Zaporowski (1988) find significant skewness in subjective distributions
using a different data set that is also based on probabilities in ‘bins’. Murasawa
(2013) reports similar findings for household inflation expectations comparing the
normal, skew-normal, and skew-t distributions. In the lab, Pfajfar & Žakelj (2016)
find significant asymmetry in confidence intervals of expected inflation in differ-
ent monetary policy environments but treatments which do not allow participants
to specify asymmetric intervals perform better. Clements (2014) studies SPF data
and reports that allowing for asymmetry in individual distributions has no sig-
nificant effect on forecast means and variances. In line with the latter paper and
using survey data, Bruine de Bruin, Manski, Topa & van der Klaauw (2011) find
that the mean of individual distributions is an accurate statistic for expected infla-
tion at the aggregate level. However, in many cases it offers a poor description of
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individual expectations. A different but related strand of the literature compares
forecasters’ point predictions with the central tendencies of their subjective prob-
ability distributions, generally finding that the two measures do not always agree
(Engelberg et al. (2009), Clements (2010)). Our paper also relates to a rich liter-
ature in financial markets theory. De Bondt (1993) found skewness in subjective
probability distributions of investors. This was also found in the lab by Du and
Budescu (2007), who report skewness in participants’ expected returns intervals
depending on whether they expect asset prices to rise or fall.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and
provides some illustrations for the inflation expectations of our respondents. In
Section 3 we discuss the results of our survey by focusing first on the degree of
asymmetry in expected inflation distributions and whether asymmetry is related
to interval measures. We then impose the piecewise uniform distribution to derive
moments of subjective distributions and aggregate expectations. In a simulation
experiment, we investigate whether accounting for asymmetry matters for the
aggregate distribution and what drives its skewness.
2 The survey
In this section we detail our survey methodology. We designed the survey to be
short in order to get a maximum response rate. The target group comprised non-
professional forecasters with an economic background, so that we could be sure
that they were familiar with the basic concepts and knew who Ben Bernanke and
Janet Yellen were. We sent invitations to complete the online survey by e-mail be-
tween December 2013 and February 2014, providing a link to a homepage hosted
by the University of Zurich.
The survey was answered by 182 economists from the Federal Reserve System, the
European System of Central Banks, Norges Bank, Riksbank, Stanford University,
University of Chicago, Columbia University, University of California at Berkeley,
Bocconi University, University of St. Gallen, University of Zurich and Swiss Na-
tional Bank, among others. The online survey presented participants with four
questions on three pages about headline inflation expectations in the US over the
next two years.4 Their answers were saved in a database. The estimated response
4We have chosen that forecast horizon as a ‘golden mean’ between very short-term expectations,
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time was roughly 1.5 minutes.
An overview of the four questions is given in Table 1. The first question, “Do
you have a background in economics and/or statistics?” (yes/no), was designed to
test whether we were reaching the target audience and was used to select only
those that actually did have such a background (only two respondents indicated
that they didn’t have an economic background). In question 2, respondents were
asked to provide an interval for their expectations regarding headline CPI infla-
tion5 over the next two years after Janet Yellen begins her appointment as chair
of the Federal Reserve, which we refer to as the ‘baseline’ scenario. In question
3, respondents were asked to provide an interval under the assumption that Ben
Bernanke would remain at that post, the ‘counterfactual’ scenario. For question 4
we randomly assigned participants to one of four groups as detailed in Table 1. We
asked participants to report the probability (in %) that average headline inflation
would be below (groups 1 and 3) or above (groups 2 and 4) the midrange of the
interval that they provided in questions 2 and 3, if Ben Bernanke had remained
chairman (groups 1 and 2), or under Janet Yellen (groups 3 and 4).
The political framing of the questions was intended to prevent participants from
answering the survey as if it were a purely technical inquiry. We anticipated that
most of the respondents in our sample would be well aware of different methods
for estimating inflation, and we intended to put the focus on a real–world scenario
instead of methodological aspects. Questions 2 and 3 were posed on the same
survey page so that respondents directly saw that they needed to provide two
intervals, one for Janet Yellen as chair, and one for Ben Bernanke as chair.
Our randomization strategy in question 4 corresponds to a between-subjects de-
sign. An alternative method would have been to ask every respondent to give
the probability of inflation being below or above their interval midrange in both
scenarios or to elicit individual distributions in some other way. We chose the
between-subjects randomization strategy instead of a within-subjects design for
the following reasons. First, we are only interested in whether expected inflation
which primarily depend on observed inflation, and very long-term expectations, which are usually
related to credibility of the central bank’s inflation target. The former expectations are arguably
unrelated to monetary policy actions, whereas the latter expectations would probably display very
low disagreement.
5Headline CPI inflation was chosen as a familiar measure of inflation among non-professional
forecasters in an effort to avoid additional explanations or any possible sense of intimidation
among the respondents.
5
probability distributions are symmetric and whether asymmetries matter for ag-
gregation, not in the shape of individual distributions. Second, our worry with a
within-subjects design was that respondents would be trying to give consistent an-
swers instead of emphasizing their subjective probability for excess risks of higher
inflation and lower inflation, respectively. Third, the between-subjects design al-
lowed us to keep the survey very short, which we thought would help us reach a
higher response rate.
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Table 1: Survey design
Question Group Wording Answers
1 all
Do you have a background in economics and/or
statistics?
yes/no
2 all
Where do you expect to see average headline
inflation* in the U.S. over the next two years after
Janet Yellen begins her appointment as the new
chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed)?
interval
a to b
3 all
Where do you expect to see average headline
inflation* in the U.S. over the next two years if Ben
Bernanke had remained chairman of the Fed?
interval
a to b
4 1
Were Ben Bernanke to remain chairman of the
Fed, what would be the probability of average
headline inflation over the next two years being
below (a+b) /2†?
p
4 2
Were Ben Bernanke to remain chairman of the
Fed, what would be the probability of average
headline inflation over the next two years being
above (a+b) /2†?
p
4 3
After Janet Yellen takes the helm of the Fed, what
is the probability of average headline inflation
over the next two years being below (a+b) /2†?
p
4 4
After Janet Yellen takes the helm of the Fed, what
is the probability of average headline inflation
over the next two years being above (a+b) /2†?
p
Notes: † (a+b) /2 refers to the midrange of the interval provided by respondents in questions
2 and 3, respectively. The sign * denoted a footnote in questions 2 and 3 that stated: “* Annual
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics”. The respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four groups for question
four, as explained in the main text. Both the intervals (questions 2-3) and probability (question
4) were asked in terms of a field where any number could be entered. Small arrows on the
side allowed respondents to modify their number upwards or downwards in 0.1 increments.
The 182 respondents completed the survey between December 6, 2013 and Febru-
ary 28, 2014.6 Figure 1 plots the intervals the respondents provided for the two
6This excludes two respondents who indicated that they did not have an economic background,
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scenarios, ordered by time at which their response was recorded in the database.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics. Regarding the inflation prediction intervals,
we see that they look similar both in terms of spread and midrange, irrespective
of whether Janet Yellen or Ben Bernanke were heading the Fed. A few respon-
dents factor in some probability for deflation (negative inflation) in their lower
bounds, while some indicate at least a possibility for very high inflation (8%). The
midranges are close to two percent. The mean indicated probability that average
inflation is higher or lower than the midrange is close to 50%. One observation
from Table 2 is that there is substantial heterogeneity in subjective distributions
among the respondents to our survey. The interval midranges implied by the an-
swers to questions 2 and 3 range from 0.5% to 5% while the probabilities associ-
ated with inflation of a certain magnitude range from 0.025 to 0.9, a finding we
will return to below.
Figure 1: Surveyed intervals of expected inflation.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Question Mean st.dev. Min Max
Q1. Economist (0=no, 1=yes) 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Q2. Yellen lower bound 1.195 0.813 -2.000 4.000
Q2. Yellen upper bound 2.835 1.032 1.000 8.000
Q2. Yellen midrange 2.015 0.738 0.500 5.000
Q3. Bernanke lower bound 1.148 0.752 -2.000 3.000
Q3. Bernanke upper bound 2.684 0.917 0.900 8.000
Q3. Bernanke midrange 1.916 0.638 0.500 5.000
Q4. Probability 0.496 0.170 0.025 0.900
Observations 182
Finally, in Table 3, we check whether our randomization strategy worked, by com-
paring answers to questions 2 and 3 among our four groups. Note that random-
ization only affected question 4, so there should not be a statistically significant
difference in answers to the previous questions. Group sizes are similar and close
to 50. Lower and upper bounds of the inflation intervals, as well as the midranges
of the intervals are similar for the four groups. In column 4 of Table 3, we report
p-values for the Kruskal-Wallis rank-sum test, a test whether the distributions of
answers of the four groups are from the same population. In column 5 of Table
3 we report p-values for the Wald test when regressing answers on group indica-
tor variables. The p-values are well above any usually accepted significance level,
which suggests that assignment to a group was not related to previous answers.
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We conclude from these results that our randomization strategy worked.
Table 3: Randomization
Mean answer
Question Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 P > χ2† P > F‡
Q2. Yellen lower bound 1.255 1.183 1.030 1.318 0.434 0.383
Q2. Yellen upper bound 2.995 2.937 2.650 2.745 0.509 0.355
Q2. Yellen midrange 2.125 2.060 1.840 2.032 0.275 0.306
Q3. Bernanke lower bound 1.162 1.154 1.016 1.259 0.565 0.509
Q3. Bernanke upper bound 2.817 2.798 2.548 2.559 0.471 0.326
Q3. Bernanke midrange 1.989 1.976 1.782 1.909 0.431 0.399
Observations 42 52 44 44 182 182
Notes: † Column “P > χ2” reports the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis rank-sum test for whether the distri-
butions of the four groups are from the same population. ‡ Column “P > F” reports the p-value for the Wald
test when regressing question answers on group indicator variables. If belonging to a group had explanatory
power regarding questions 2 and 3, this value should be low (e.g. below 0.05).
3 Results
This section starts by analysing the asymmetry of subjective probability distribu-
tions. We then ask whether there are systematic patterns between asymmetry
and intervals of expected inflation in subsection 3.2. Next, we assume a para-
metric subjective distribution and look how asymmetry relates to its moments in
subsection 3.3. Finally, we analyse the aggregate distribution of inflation expec-
tations and briefly address the differences between provided intervals conditional
on who the Fed chair is in the last two subsections.
3.1 Asymmetry in subjective distributions
Are subjective inflation expectation distributions symmetric? Using the results
from our survey, we can directly test this question. We asked respondents for the
probability that US headline inflation would be below (groups 1 and 3) and above
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(groups 2 and 4) the midrange of the interval they provided, respectively.7 In what
follows, we let pL denote the probability that average headline inflation is below
the midrange. For groups 1 and 3 pL = p and we let pL = 1− p for groups 2 and 4.8
In column (1) of Table 4 we report the percentage of respondents who responded
with a probability different from 0.5. Among all respondents, 60.4% thought the
probability that inflation would be below/above their midpoint was different from
0.5. Among the four groups to which we randomly assigned respondents, the per-
centage reporting a probability different from 0.5 ranges from 59.1% to 63.5%.9
Thus, the majority of our respondents have asymmetric subjective distributions of
expected inflation.
7For groups 1 and 2 the question referred to the interval provided in question 3 (counterfactual
scenario, i.e. Ben Bernanke remains chair); for groups 3 and 4 the question referred to the interval
provided in question 2 (baseline scenario, i.e. Janet Yellen becomes chair). For details see Section
2.
8This holds exactly if the subjective distribution of expected inflation has a continuous cumula-
tive probability density function, which is a standard assumption in the literature.
9Coincidentally, in both groups 3 and 4, 18 respondents answered with pL = 0.5 and 26 respon-
dents with pL 6= 0.5.
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Table 4: Asymmetry in Inflation Expectations
Sample Obs.
share with
pL 6= 0.5 95% CI
Mean absolute dev.
from pL = 0.5
(excl. pL = 0.5)
Mean pL
Mean pL
(excl. pL = 0.5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All 182 0.6044 [0.5334,0.6754] 0.1939 0.5027 0.5044
(0.0096) (0.0126) (0.0209)
Group 1 42 0.5952 [0.4468,0.7437] 0.1940 0.5060 0.5100
(0.0192) (0.0260) (0.0440)
Group 2 52 0.6346 [0.5037,0.7655] 0.2153 0.5132 0.5208
(0.0196) (0.0270) (0.0427)
Group 3 44 0.5909 [0.4456,0.7362] 0.1904 0.4916 0.4858
(0.0168) (0.0244) (0.0415)
Group 4 44 0.5909 [0.4456,0.7362] 0.1700 0.4982 0.4969
(0.0198) (0.0231) (0.0393)
Notes: This table reports results for the question(s) “Were [...] chairman of the Fed, what would be the probability of average
headline inflation over the next two years being below/above (a+b) /2?” where a and b denote the endpoints of the interval
the respondent provided in question 2/3 (see Section 2 for details). We denote by pL the probability reported or implied for
average inflation to fall below the interval midrange. Column (1) reports the share of respondents who answered pL 6= 0.5,
column (2) reports approximate 95% confidence intervals for this estimate if treated as a Bernoulli variable (where success
is defined as pL 6= 0.5), column (3) reports the mean absolute deviation from pL = 0.5 for respondents who indicated pL 6= 0.5
and the associated standard error, column (4) reports the mean and standard error of pL, column (5) reports the same but
excluding cases where pL = 0.5.
If we treat the probability our respondents supplied as a Bernoulli variable, taking
on 1 if pL 6= 0.5, and 0 if pL = 0.5 with a ‘success rate’ r, then column (1) reports
an estimate of rˆ and we can calculate approximate normal confidence intervals
for rˆ, reported in column (2). The bounds of our confidence intervals are away
from 0 (everybody has symmetric expectations) and 1 (everybody has asymmetric
expectations). For the whole sample, the confidence interval excludes 0.5 and the
corresponding z-test against H0 : r = 0.5 rejects at the 1% significance level. Is the
share of respondents with asymmetric expectations the same in the four groups?
To answer this question, we carried out the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-population
rank test adjusted for ties. The associated χ2 statistic is 0.362 (p-value 0.9480).
Thus, we cannot reject that the four groups come from the same population.
Furthermore, it did not seem to matter whether we asked respondents about
the probability of inflation below (groups 1 and 3) or above (groups 2 and 4) the
midrange of the provided interval. The difference in pL between groups 1 and 3
and groups 2 and 4 is -0.7697 with a standard error of 2.5207 (the p-value of a
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two sided test against zero is 0.760). In terms of asymmetry of respondents’ sub-
jective distributions it also did not seem to matter whether we asked about the
baseline scenario (Janet Yellen becoming chair, groups 3 and 4) or the counterfac-
tual scenario (Ben Bernanke remaining chair, groups 1 and 2). The difference in
pL between groups 3 and 4 and groups 1 and 2 is -1.5060 with a standard error of
2.5134 (p-value 0.55).
Testing whether the probability is exactly equal to 0.5 does not take into account
the possibility that reported asymmetries could be very small. All respondents
who report pL 6= 0.5 could deviate only trivially, since we did not provide them
with categories or a scale for their answers. For example, the reported probability
could be 0.5001, which would clearly not constitute a meaningful deviation. To get
a sense of how far our respondents’ subjective probability distributions of expected
inflation deviate from symmetry, we report the mean absolute deviation from pL =
0.5 for the respondents who answered pL 6= 0.5 in column (3) of Table 4. For the
whole sample, this is 0.1939 and statistically different from 0 at any conventional
significance level. In each of the randomly assigned sub-samples, the deviation is
large and strongly significantly different from 0.
From the results presented so far, we conclude that subjective inflation expecta-
tions are asymmetric for about 60% of our respondents and that the deviation
from symmetry is sizeable. This result mirrors similar findings by García & Man-
zanares (2007) in the SPF, and Pfajfar & Žakelj (2016) in an experimental set-
ting.10 The advantage of our survey setting is that we directly asked respondents
about symmetry. Compared to the literature analysing the SPF, we thus make no
functional form assumptions about subjective distributions and face measurement
error issues to estimate the degree of (a)symmetry of inflation expectations.
In columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 we report the average probability that inflation
is below the midrange for the whole sample and for respondents who answered
with pL 6= 0.5, respectively. Despite significant asymmetry in the subjective distri-
butions of our respondents, the probability that inflation is below the midranges
implied by their confidence intervals is on average close to 50%. In our sample
of economists and at this particular point in time, there is no systematic skew in
10Specifically, García & Manzanares (2007, p.19) report that “more than 60% of the SPF individ-
ual probability forecasts have skewness index γ1 higher than 0.3 (in absolute value).” Pfajfar &
Žakelj (2016, p.850): “For the latter case, we find that only 12.5% of reported confidence intervals
are symmetric.”
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subjective distributions towards the lower or upper end of intervals of expected
inflation.
3.2 Asymmetry and Intervals of Expected Inflation
We next turn to analyzing whether there are systematic patterns in the asymme-
try of respondents’ subjective distributions of expected inflation. To have as much
statistical power as possible, we pool responses from the two scenarios (baseline
and counterfactual). This means our sample in what follows consists of the inter-
vals provided in question 2 (baseline, i.e. Janet Yellen becomes chair) for groups 3
and 4, and question 3 (counterfactual, i.e. Ben Bernanke remains chair) for groups
1 and 2. For all respondents in this sample we thus have an interval of expected
average headline inflation in 2014-2015 and the probability assigned to inflation
falling below the interval’s midrange (either directly from question 4 or implied
by pL = 1− p). We conducted all analyses that follow for the sub-samples of re-
spondents in the two scenarios and found qualitatively similar results with lower
statistical significance.11
Table 5 shows summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) of our measures
based on the intervals for the full sample (column 1), respondents with pL = 0.5
(column 2), respondents with pL 6= 0.5 (column 3), respondents who indicated that
they had a right-skewed (column 4) and left-skewed distribution (column 5), re-
spectively. Respondents who have an asymmetric distribution of expected infla-
tion tend to have higher midranges and narrower intervals, which appears to be
mainly driven by higher lower bounds of their intervals. We cannot statistically
reject, however, that the differences are zero. Thus, there does not appear to be
a systematic relationship between interval measures and whether or not respon-
dents report a probability of inflation falling below their midrange different from
0.5.
11Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5: Asymmetry and interval measures
symmetric vs asymmetric right- vs left-skew
Sample all pL = 0.5 pL 6= 0.5 Diff.(3)-(2) pL > 0.5 pL < 0.5
Diff.
(6)-(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Interval midrange 1.9596 1.8708 2.0177 0.1469 2.1453 1.8991 -0.2462
(0.6706) (0.6689) (0.6683) 0.1490 (0.7241) (0.5940) 0.0548
Interval width 1.5885 1.6222 1.5664 -0.0559 1.3321 1.7842 0.4521
(1.0791) (1.1413) (1.0412) 0.7387 (0.9308) (1.0979) 0.0214
Interval lower bound 1.1654 1.0597 1.2345 0.1748 1.4792 1.0070 -0.4722
(0.7866) (0.8125) (0.7650) 0.1481 (0.7017) (0.7566) 0.0010
Interval upper bound 2.7538 2.6819 2.8009 0.1190 2.8113 2.7912 -0.0201
(0.9289) (0.9413) (0.9221) 0.4017 (0.9947) (0.8578) 0.9102
Observations 182 72 110 182 53 57 110
Notes: Columns 1-3 and 5-6 show means and standard deviations for the full sample and by pL provided
by respondents. Column (4) is the difference between columns (2) and (3) (symmetric vs asymmetric). Col-
umn (7) is the difference between columns (5) and (6) (right-skew vs left-skew). Numbers in parentheses
are standard deviations. Numbers in italics are p-values of a two-sided test against zero.
Columns 5-7 of Table 5 compare interval measures between respondents with
right- and left-skewed distributions, respectively. The midrange is 0.25 points
lower among respondents with left-skewed (pL < 0.5) compared to those with
right-skewed expectations. This difference is weakly statistically significant with
a p-value of the two-sided test against zero of 0.055. However, the (non-parametric)
Kendall’s tau rank correlation between the midrange and pL is 0.0876 with a p-
value of 0.1195. From our sample, we cannot conclude that there is a statistically
significant relationship between the midrange and pL.
In principle, the positive relationship between the level of expected inflation and
asymmetry could matter for aggregating inflation expectations. If respondents
with left-skewed expectations systematically expect lower inflation than respon-
dents with right-skewed expectations, the aggregate distribution would have much
less probability mass in the tails than otherwise.
Finally, Table 5 also shows that intervals are on average 0.45 points wider among
respondents with left-skewed compared to respondents with right-skewed expec-
tations and the difference is statistically significant. However, we note that this
finding does not translate into a robust negative association between interval
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width and the probability mass respondents put below their midrange. The corre-
lation between interval width and pL is -0.1 among respondents with pL 6= 0.5 and
not statistically significantly different from zero (p-value 0.17).
This is another channel through which asymmetry of subjective distributions could
matter for the aggregate distribution. If more uncertain forecasters attach system-
atically more probability on inflation overshooting their midrange, ceteris paribus,
the mean of the aggregate distribution should be higher than otherwise. In the ab-
sence of systematic relationships between asymmetry and the interval measures,
it is not surprising that asymmetry of subjective distributions does not matter
much for the aggregate distribution in our sample.
3.3 Parametric analysis
In this section, we impose parametric assumptions on the subjective distributions
of expected inflation. We have two goals in mind. First, we want to assess to
what degree asymmetry is related to moments of individual distributions. Second,
we want to aggregate the individual responses into one distribution of expected
inflation. Both require a functional form assumption on individual distributions.
Common distributions in the literature studying the SPF are the normal distribu-
tion, the unimodal generalized beta and skew-normal distributions for responses
comprising more than two intervals, and the triangular distribution for responses
with two intervals or one interval.12 Our survey differs from the SPF in that it
results in only two bins with variable widths. Therefore, we choose a different
approach and assume that the probability densities are piecewise uniform.13 We
also experimented with triangular and skew-normal distributions. Qualitatively,
the results are very similar under these alternative distributional assumptions.14
12See Engelberg et al. (2009) for a comprehensive discussion
13See Diebold, Tay & Wallis (1999) who make this assumption for the individual bins in the SPF
histograms.
14Regarding the triangular, unlike Engelberg et al. (2009), we do not assume individual distri-
butions are symmetric when a respondent provides probabilities in two bins. This implies the
triangular distribution is not able to fit the responses of all our respondents, but only those who
answered with 0.25 ≤ pL ≤ 0.75 (86%). Ignoring this problem (setting pL = 0.25 and pL = 0.75
for affected data points, respectively) we obtain very similar results to our main result. The only
difference is that the variances of individual and aggregate distribution are smaller, as one would
expect. These results are available upon request.
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More specifically, we assume subjective distributions of expected inflation are a
finite mixture of uniform distributions U(a,m) and U(m,b) with mixing probabili-
ties given by pL and pU = 1−pL, respectively, where pL is the probability assigned
to average inflation falling below the midrange of the provided interval (see dis-
cussion in Section 3.1 above). Therefore, we assume 100% coverage ratio for the
intervals provided by our respondents.15
The subjective distribution of respondent i thus follows the piecewise-uniform
probability density function f i(x) given by
f i (x)=

piL
mi−ai if ai ≤ x<mi
1−piL
bi−mi if mi ≤ x≤ bi
and zero elsewhere. Figure 2 illustrates the idea. This distribution is fully speci-
fied by the bounds of the interval (ai and bi, from which we calculate the midrange
mi), and piL, the probability assigned to inflation falling below mi. It is able to fit
the answers of all respondents in the sample.
Figure 2: Piecewise Uniform Example
a m b
Expected Inflation (%)
f(x)
Notes: The figure depicts the piecewise uniform for a respondent who provided interval boundaries
a and b. The area to the left of m (the interval midrange) is what we denote by pL and corresponds
to the probability (or one minus the probability) supplied in question 4.
Given f i(x) the mean (µi) and median of the piecewise uniform are given by
15In our case, the coverage ratio is arguably does not very important since we are interested
in the asymmetry of individual responses. However, the aggregate distribution could change if
the coverage ratios are different across respondents and correlated with the moments of their
subjective distribution. Since we presented all our respondents with the same question regarding
the intervals, we cannot test this assumption.
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µi = 12 [piL (mi+ai)+ (1− piL) (mi+bi)]
mediani =
mi+
0.5−piL
1−piL (bi−mi) if piL < 0.5
ai+ 0.5piL (mi−ai) if piL ≥ 0.5
Let XL ∼U(ai,mi) and XU ∼U(mi,bi) denote the part of the distribution to the
left and right of mi with weights given by piL and piU = 1− piL, respectively. The
means of the two parts are simply µiL = (ai+mi)/2 and µiU = (mi+bi)/2. The r-th
central moment of the component mixture of respondent i is then given by
E
[(
X −µi
)r]= ∑
j∈{L,U}
r∑
k=0
(
r
k
)(
µi j−µi
)r−k pi jE [(X j−µi j)k] . (1)
which helps us calculate the variance and skewness of the piecewise uniform for
every respondent. Table 6 reports averages and standard deviations of the piece-
wise uniform means, medians, variances, and skewness for the full sample and for
groups of respondents formed according to the pL they provided.
Despite the substantial degree of asymmetry in individual expected inflation doc-
umented in Section 3.1 above, the piecewise uniform means and medians are on
average close to the midranges reported in Table 5. We also find that respondents
with left-skewed expectations have significantly higher variances, similarly to the
results on interval widths presented in Table 5.16 While there is a substantial
asymmetry in the subjective distributions of inflation, these asymmetries balance
each other out on average. The average skewness of the piecewise-uniform distri-
butions is very close to zero among respondents with pL 6= 0.5 and close to ±0.5
among respondents with pL > 0.5 and pL < 0.5, respectively.
16Once again, this finding does not translate into a robust negative relationship between un-
certainty and skewness. The (linear) sample correlation between variances and skewness of the
piecewise-uniform distributions is -0.0665 and not statistically significant at any conventional
level.
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Table 6: Asymmetry and parametric measures of individual expected inflation
symmetric vs asymmetric right- vs left-skew
Sample all pL = 0.5 pL 6= 0.5 Diff.(3)-(2) pL > 0.5 pL < 0.5
Diff.
(6)-(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PWU mean 1.9668 1.8708 2.0297 0.1588 1.9956 2.0613 0.0657
(0.6611) (0.6689) (0.6513) 0.1152 (0.6909) (0.6167) 0.6009
PWU median 1.9723 1.8708 2.0388 0.1680 1.9491 2.1222 0.1732
(0.6667) (0.6689) (0.6598) 0.0976 (0.6862) (0.6289) 0.1715
PWU variance 0.2768 0.3263 0.2444 -0.0819 0.1660 0.3173 0.1513
(0.4642) (0.5681) (0.3808) 0.2836 (0.2724) (0.4495) 0.0336
PWU skewness 0.0027 -0.0000 0.0045 0.0045 0.5270 -0.4813 -1.0082
(0.4378) (0.0000) (0.5642) 0.9333 (0.2534) (0.2478) 0.0000
Observations 182 72 110 182 53 57 110
Notes: Columns 1-3 and 5-6 show means and standard deviations for the whole sample, symmetric and
asymmetric respondents, and respondents with pL > 0.5 and pL < 0.5, respectively. Column (4) shows the
difference between columns (2) and (3). Column (7) shows the difference between columns (5) and (6). Numbers
in parentheses are standard deviations. Numbers in italics are p-values of a two-sided t-test against zero.
On the whole, there does not appear to be a significant relationship between asym-
metry and the level of expected inflation as expressed in mean and median of the
subjective distribution, although we find a statistically weak difference between
respondents with pL = 0.5 and pL 6= 0.5 in medians, see Table 6. To illustrate this
point, Figure 3 plots the difference between piecewise uniform means and medi-
ans, one proxy for asymmetry, against mean expected inflation. The associated
regression gives a slope coefficient of -0.0056 with a standard error of 0.0057.
Summing up the findings in this section, we see substantial asymmetries in sub-
jective distributions of expected inflation. On aggregate, however, these asym-
metries average out. We find little evidence for systematic relationships between
asymmetry of a forecaster’s distribution and measures of central tendency of infla-
tion expectations. Just as there is substantial disagreement between forecasters
with regards to expected inflation, there is substantial disagreement with regards
to how likely it is that inflation falls into certain ranges. We do find a tendency that
respondents who provided wider intervals (more uncertainty) have left-skewed
distributions. We next look at aggregation and whether accounting for asymmetry
19
Figure 3: Asymmetry and Expected Inflation
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Notes: The figure plots mean expected inflation (x-axis) and the median - mean difference (y-axis)
for each respondent in the sample together with the sample mean expected inflation (vertical solid
line).
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of individual distributions matters for the aggregate distribution.
3.4 Aggregate inflation expectations
In this subsection, we develop an aggregate distribution of expected inflation among
our sample of economists. We then compare these expectations to the one reported
in the outcome of the SPF for Q1 2014. Finally, we discuss the asymmetry of
the aggregate distribution of inflation expectations by distinguishing between dis-
agreement among individual respondents and the asymmetry of their subjective
probability distributions.
To get an aggregate distribution of our survey respondents, we use the same as-
sumptions as in Section 3.3 above. We assume that individual distributions are
piecewise uniform and use the finite mixture distribution to form an aggregate
distribution of inflation expectations following Wallis (2005) and Boero, Smith &
Wallis (2015). We use equal weights when forming the mixture, so that each of our
n respondents has a weight of 1/n. The probability density function of the mixture
distribution is then
g(x)=
n∑
i=1
1
n
f i(x),
where f i(x) denotes the probability density functions of the individual piecewise
uniforms. The mean of the aggregate distribution (µ) is then simply the mean
of the µis we calculated above. Higher moments can be obtained using formula
(1) (see Section 3.3 above) forming the outer sum over individual responses and
substituting pi j = 1/n.
Following this aggregation procedure yields a combined mean expected inflation
in 2014 and 2015 of µ = 1.95 for the baseline groups (Yellen becomes chair), µ =
1.98 for the counterfactual groups (Bernanke remains chair), and µ= 1.97 for the
full sample, see Panel A of Table 7. These can be compared to the outcome of
the SPF released in February 2014.17 SPF mean expected fourth-quarter over
fourth-quarter headline inflation was 1.81% for 2014 and 1.98% for 2015, which
corresponds to an annualized average inflation of 1.90% over the two years.18 The
17A complete write–up of the survey is available at http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-
data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/2014/spfq114.pdf.
18To get the two year annualized average we calculate the geometric mean of 2014Q4/2013Q4
and 2015Q4/2014Q4 inflation for each SPF respondent and then calculate the average over all
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same exercise reveals that median expected inflation in our sample of respondents
is also close to median inflation expected by SPF respondents.19
Table 7: Aggregate Distribution and Simulations
Full sample Baseline
(Yellen)
Counterfactual
(Bernanke)
PANEL A. DATA
Mean 1.9668 1.9505 1.9821
CDF at mean 0.5444 0.5350 0.5511
Median 1.8928 1.8981 1.8878
Variance 0.7115 0.7116 0.7109
Skewness 0.6322 0.3834 0.8661
PANEL B. NO ASYMMETRY
Mean 1.9596 1.9358 1.9819
CDF at mean 0.5375 0.5337 0.5386
Median 1.8953 1.8813 1.9093
Variance 0.7540 0.7046 0.7993
Skewness 0.7252 0.2937 1.0501
PANEL C. NO DISAGREEMENT
Mean 1.9668 1.9505 1.9821
CDF at mean 0.4990 0.4974 0.5005
Median 1.9677 1.9526 1.9817
Variance 0.2768 0.2557 0.2967
Skewness 0.0187 -0.1144 0.1183
Observations 182 88 94
Notes: The table reports mean, probability mass below mean, median, variance and skewness
of the mixture distribution for the full sample (column 1), respondents in the baseline scenario
(column 2) and respondents in the counterfactual scenario (column 3). Panel A uses the data from
our survey. Panel B reports results if we impose pL = 0.5 before forming the aggregate distribution
(no asymmetry for all respondents). In Panel C we first fit the piecewise uniforms and then re-
center respondents’ intervals so that the means of all respondents are equal to the aggregate mean.
More importantly, the aggregate distribution has a moderate positive skewness of
0.63,20 which corresponds to patterns seen in the SPF, see García & Manzanares
(2007). Skewness is closer to zero in the baseline aggregate distribution as opposed
respondents.
19The median expected inflation in our survey is 1.90% (baseline), 1.89% (counterfactual), and
1.89% in the full sample. Median expected headline inflation among SPF respondents was 1.80%
for 2014 and 2.00% for 2015. The median annualized average was 1.92% over the two years.
20Skewness lower than -1 and higher than 1 is considered high, between -1 and -0.5 or 0.5 and 1
as moderate, and between -0.5 and 0.5 as approximately symmetric, see Bulmer (1979).
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to the counterfactual scenario. However, we note that skewness is sensitive to
outliers. If we remove respondent 56 from the sample (group 2, a = 2, b = 8,
pL = 0.85), skewness becomes 0.67 in the counterfactual group and 0.52 in the
full sample (excluding respondent 56).
3.4.1 A simulation experiment
It may be surprising that the aggregate distribution is somewhat positively skewed
given that individual asymmetries seemingly balance each other out, as shown
above. But even if subjective distributions were perfectly symmetric, the ag-
gregate distribution could still exhibit asymmetry, because respondents disagree
about the level of future inflation. In this section, we conduct a simulation exer-
cise to uncover the importance of asymmetry for the aggregate distribution and
disentangle asymmetry from disagreement. We define asymmetry as pL 6= 0.5. As
a measure of disagreement, we use differences in mean expected inflation between
respondents.21
The design of our survey allows us to ‘simulate’ survey responses as follows. First,
we ‘switch off ’ asymmetry by imposing pL = 0.5 for all respondents. Using this
simulated sample, we form the aggregate mixture as above and calculate its mo-
ments. The results of this exercise are shown in Panel B of Table 7. In a second
simulation, we ‘switch off ’ disagreement among respondents by re-centering their
intervals so that the means of the individual piecewise uniform distributions are
equal to the mean of the aggregate distribution (first row in Panel A of Table 7).
The results of this second exercise are shown in Panel C of Table 7.
Switching off asymmetry has little effect on the moments of the aggregate dis-
tribution. The mean slightly decreases while the median increases for the full
sample. This is in line with the positive association between left skewness and
uncertainty discussed in Section 3.3 above. More uncertain respondents tend to
put more probability mass above the midrange. Ignoring asymmetry thus leads
to a slight underestimate of the aggregate mean, although the difference is small.
Variance and skewness of the aggregate distribution also slightly increase when
21In the literature studying the SPF, disagreement usually means differences in point predic-
tions. The mean of subjective distributions of expected inflation is one candidate to give rise to
point predictions. Our results are not sensitive to whether we use the mean or the median of the
individual distributions for this exercise.
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we switch off asymmetry.22 The former is in line with the results discussed in
Section 3.3 above. Our respondents’ subjective distributions exhibit a tendency to
be skewed towards the common mean. Ignoring asymmetry thus implies a slight
decrease in precision.
Switching off disagreement (Panel C) has much stronger effects on the higher
moments of the aggregate distribution. Now the variance decreases to 0.2768
and skewness is close to zero. These two experiments show that in our sample
of economists, disagreement is responsible for skewness (and much of the uncer-
tainty) of the aggregate distribution of expected inflation while asymmetry plays
only a minor role. If all the respondents in our survey had given an identical mean
expected inflation, the aggregate distribution would have been almost perfectly
symmetric despite a high degree of asymmetry in individual responses. This re-
sult is in line with our analysis of asymmetry at the individual level above. While
there is a substantial degree of asymmetry in the distributions of expected infla-
tion among our respondents, these asymmetries cancel out on average.
Accounting for asymmetry of subjective distributions of expected inflation does
not seem overly important based on these results. A simple survey question elicit-
ing interval predictions would contain as much information about mean expected
inflation and uncertainty as a question allowing for asymmetry. We caution, how-
ever, that this may only be true for this particular point in time and one should be
careful when trying to extrapolate this result.
3.5 Ben Bernanke vs Janet Yellen
Preferences of a central banker and therefore the likely path of future interest
rates are important determinants of inflation expectations. Even though news re-
ports at the time of our survey portrayed madame chair Yellen as a dovish policy-
maker,23 both chairman Bernanke and madame chair Yellen are considered to be
consensus-builders24 in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), and there-
22Note that the latter result is quite sensitive to outliers. If we drop respondent 56 from the
sample, skewness decreases from 0.52 to 0.36 when we switch off asymmetry (full sample).
23See for example the outcome of the “CNBC October Fed Survey” reported by Ya-
hoo! Finance and available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/yellen-more-dovish-bernanke-survey-
182219199.html (retrieved on 30.10.2016.
24See for example the news article from Reuters available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-fed-yellen-idUSKCN0SK0C520151026 (retrieved on 30.10.2016).
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fore monetary policy in the US should be largely unaffected by who the FOMC
chair is.25
As a matter of fact, the measures of central tendency shown above are not signif-
icantly different between the two scenarios. The majority of respondents (69%)
in our sample gave the same interval for expected inflation conditional on who
the Fed chair is. We compare the distributions of lower and upper bounds for the
two scenarios in Figure 4, which plots kernel densities using a normal kernel. To
see whether the distributions are statistically different we use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. We could not reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions
are statistically the same, with a test statistic of 0.054 (p-value 0.94) for the lower
bound and 0.076 (0.64) for the upper bound. Our aggregate distribution does indi-
cate that expected inflation would have been slightly higher if Ben Bernanke had
remained at the helm of the Fed. According to Panel A of Table 7, mean expected
inflation is 1.9505 under Janet Yellen vs 1.9821 under Ben Bernanke.
Figure 4: Kernel densities of surveyed intervals.
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Notes: The figure reports estimated kernel densities of lower and upper bound for expected infla-
tion conditional on Janet Yellen (solid gray line) or Ben Bernanke (dashed black line) being Fed
chair. The estimate is based on a normal kernel function, using a window parameter (width) that
is a function of the given number of points.
25We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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4 Conclusion
We conducted a simple survey that directly tests for asymmetry in subjective dis-
tributions of expected inflation in the US. Survey results show that about 60%
of respondents have asymmetric inflation expectation distributions and that the
deviation from asymmetry is large. Interestingly, we find that individual asym-
metries balance each other out on average and display no systematic relationship
to other moments of subjective distribution. One implication of this result is that
using interval midpoints from surveys gives an accurate representation of aver-
age expected inflation. This could be augmented by interval length as one possible
summary statistic for the degree of uncertainty, although we leave investigations
about how well interval length proxies for different measures of uncertainty to
future studies.
The aggregate distribution we obtain has a mean that is close to the average point
prediction obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in the first quarter
of 2014 and a moderately positive skewness. The aggregate skewness seem to be
driven by disagreement among respondents and not the asymmetry of their sub-
jective distributions. In fact, disregarding the individual asymmetry completely
changes little in terms of mean and variance of the aggregate distribution. We
caution that our results reflect expectations at a particular point in time, and that
it may well be that our findings depend on the general business cycle situation.
References
Boero, Gianna, Jeremy Smith & Kenneth F. Wallis (2015). ’The Measurement and
Characteristics of Professional Forecasters’ Uncertainty’, Journal of Applied
Econometrics, Vol. 30, No. 7, pp. 1029–1046.
Bruine de Bruin, Wändi, Charles F. Manski, Giorgio Topa & Wilbert van der
Klaauw (2011). ’Measuring consumer uncertainty about future inflation’, Jour-
nal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 454–478.
Bulmer, Michael G. (1979). ’Principles of statistics’, Dover publications, Vol. 3,
reprint of the second 1967 edition.
Clements, Michael P. (2010). ’Explanations of the inconsistencies in survey respon-
dents’ forecasts’, European Economic Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 536–549.
26
Clements, Michael P. (2014). ’US Inflation Expectations and Heterogeneous Loss
Functions, 1968-2010’, Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 1–14.
De Bondt, Werner F.M. (1993). ’Betting on trends: Intuitive forecasts of financial
risk and return’, International Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 355 –
371.
Diebold, Francis X., Anthony S. Tay & Kenneth F. Wallis (1999). ’Inflation: The
Survey of Professional Forecasters’, in R. F. Engle & H. White eds. Cointegra-
tion, Causality, and Forecasting: A Festschrift in Honour of Clive WJ Granger :
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 76–90.
Du, Ning & David V. Budescu (2007). ’Does past volatility affect investors’ price
forecasts and confidence judgements?’, International Journal of Forecasting,
Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 497 – 511.
Elliott, Graham, Ivana Komunjer & Allan Timmermann (2008). ’Biases in Macroe-
conomic Forecasts: Irrationality or Asymmetric Loss?’, Journal of the European
Economic Association, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 122–157.
Engelberg, Joseph, Charles F. Manski & Jared Williams (2009). ’Comparing the
Point Predictions and Subjective Probability Distributions of Professional Fore-
casters’, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 30–41.
García, Juan Angel & Andrés Manzanares (2007). ’What can probability forecasts
tell us about inflation risks?’, Working Paper Series 0825, European Central
Bank.
Giordani, Paolo & Paul Söderlind (2003). ’Inflation forecast uncertainty’, European
Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 6, pp. 1037 – 1059.
Lahiri, Kajal, Christie Teigland & Mark Zaporowski (1988). ’Interest Rates and
the Subjective Probability Distribution of Inflation Forecasts’, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. pp. 233–248.
Murasawa, Yasutomo (2013). ’Measuring Inflation Expectations Using Interval-
Coded Data’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp.
602–623.
Pfajfar, Damjan & Blaž Žakelj (2016). ’Uncertainty in forecasting inflation and
monetary policy design: Evidence from the laboratory’, International Journal of
Forecasting, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 849 – 864.
27
Wallis, Kenneth F. (2005). ’Combining Density and Interval Forecasts: A Modest
Proposal’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, pp. 983–994.
28
Appendix
Here, we compare the aggregate distribution we obtain from our survey partici-
pants to the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The SPF asks participants
to specify probabilities that Core CPI inflation falls into certain bins over a number
of different horizons. Since our survey asked about expected inflation over a two
year horizon, we compare our aggregate distribution to the SPF one year and two
years ahead fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter inflation rates.26 Note that our
results are not directly comparable to the SPF histograms, as headline inflation is
more volatile than core inflation. Nevertheless, we argue that this comparison is
useful to shed some light on whether our aggregate distribution looks ‘reasonable’.
We construct the SPF histograms following the SPF methodology by averaging
the individual PMFs within each bin. Using the CDF of our aggregate mixture
distribution, we can similarly calculate the aggregate probability our survey re-
spondents assigned to inflation falling into these bins. Figure A.1 shows the re-
sult of this exercise. The histograms are roughly comparable in terms of location
and shape. As would be expected when comparing headline and core inflation, our
respondents assigned more probability to the extremes. We also note that they
assigned more probability to comparably low inflation (1% to 1.4%).
26For Core CPI the SPF asks the participants to provide “the mean probability that the fourth-
quarter over fourth-quarter percent change in falls in a particular range.”
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Figure A.1: Comparison to the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
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Notes: This figure compares the histogram of the aggregate mixture distribution of ‘baseline’
groups 3 and 4 (see Table 1) and ‘counterfactual’ groups 1 and 2 to the annual (Q4 over Q4) Core
CPI inflation forecasts for 2014 and 2015 from the Survey of Professional Forecasters released in
February 2014.
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